Does the Euthyphro Dilemma Argue For Theism? (Part Two)

Marc Schooley, author of the The Areopagus, (who also comments as MS Quixote) argues adamantly in a post on his blog that the Euthyphro Dilemma advances theism. MS Quixote referenced this argument during a discussion on the reasons why people are theists or atheists at the blog Daylight Atheism.

I intend to present a comprehensive case as to why the Euthyphro Dilemma advances atheism, but to do this, I must substantively and seriously address the reasons given by MS Quixote as to why he believes the Euthyphro Dilemma advances theism. This is my goal, and I intend to demonstrate my case thoroughly and convincingly.

This is my second post which analyzes MS Quixote's argument for why the Euthyphro Dilemma advances theism rather than atheism.

Last time, I explained my assertion that one cannot avoid the ED by positing that the paradigm of goodness is embedded in God's nature:

The first philosophic move of the theist is to pass through the horns of the ED by locating the Good as the nature of God. In effect, the theist answers the dilemma by saying “neither.” Hence, the theist claims that the good is not independent of God, as posited by horn one, nor is the good commanded by God, as claimed by horn two. In effect, a tertium quid is presented: God’s nature is the paradigm of goodness. God’s nature is the good...Note, the theist objection does not say that God’s nature is good; it says that God’s nature is the good.

(The emphasis on the final sentence of that quote is solely mine.)

MS Quixote tries to argue that the paradigm of goodness is embedded in God's nature; but he is simultaneously arguing that God's nature is "the good" rather than good. So he seems to be arguing that there is, in fact, no way to tell whether the paradigm of goodness really is, in and of itself, actually good.

Let's try to use your argument for a thought experiment:

Goodness is embedded in God's nature necessarily, since God is the paradigm of goodness. God's standard for goodness is not a coherent concept - because God is the standard. But why is God good? Because he is; it's a brute fact of existence - deal with it. But what if God's nature was malevolent: if God's nature is the paradigm of goodness, and God's nature is malevolent, then is malevolence actually goodness? God could've been anything, but he just is good. We just got lucky that he isn't apathetic or malevolent or bipolar. God's the standard for goodness because he is - through God, all things are. We know God is good because all things are patterned from him - we can tell that all things are patterned from God's goodness, we can tell that he is the ultimate paradigm, because that's just exactly the kind of world we seem to inhabit:

No random, indiscriminate earthquakes, volcano eruptions, mudslides, or tsunamis,

No rampant diseases such as polio, typhoid, smallpox, or the Black Plague,

Just goodness. We know God is good because that's just the way the world works.

You want evidence, you say? You want to know if this assertion really means something?

Just examine the world around you. Then you'll know.

Why do we really say that God is the paradigm of goodness? Why do we really believe in a maximally great being?

Perhaps it's comforting. Perhaps it's disorienting to believe that we are here on this planet, in the middle of this universe, lacking guidance, lacking care, and lacking supervision.

Perhaps that was the best explanation we had at one time. Perhaps it helps us derive meaning from our existence. Perhaps we feel that it keeps us in touch with the traditions of our families and our communities.

It doesn't mean anything to say that any God is the paradigm of goodness if we refuse to define a standard for goodness. So you say that God is the standard? Fine, judge God by his handiwork, if that's what you believe.

God is "the good", you say. God is "maximally great", you say. How do you know?, I say.

Do you know that God's nature is the paradigm of goodness because it is good, or do you know that God's nature is the paradigm of goodness because it is his nature, by fiat?

If you know that God's nature is the paradigm of goodness because of some outside standard, then your God is inferior to that standard. If you know that God's nature is the paradigm of goodness because it is - by fiat - then you've admitted that you have no basis for interpreting God's nature as "good" or "evil".

Whatever God's nature becomes (or rather, what it has become) is the good; whatever it does not become (or rather, what it has not become) is not the good. As a consequence, you have absolutely no idea what the good resultant from God's nature should be, nor what it is, nor what it means.

Anyone can say, "this comes from God, it must be the good!"

"Those who can make you believe absurdities, can make you believe atrocities." - Voltaire

Does the Euthyphro Dilemma Argue For Theism? (Part One)

Marc Schooley, author of the The Areopagus, (who also comments as MS Quixote) argues adamantly in a post on his blog that the Euthyphro Dilemma advances theism. MS Quixote referenced this argument during a discussion on the reasons why people are theists or atheists at the blog Daylight Atheism.

I intend to present a comprehensive case as to why the Euthyphro Dilemma advances atheism, but to do this, I must substantively and seriously address the reasons given by MS Quixote as to why he believes the Euthyphro Dilemma advances theism. This is my goal, and I intend to demonstrate my case thoroughly and convincingly.

First, I must commend MS Quixote for his well-written and well-argued critique of ED. I recommend his summary of ED and the surrounding controversies to anyone who desires to obtain a solid understanding of what exactly the dilemma is, and what is meant by it, when both theists and atheists refer to it.

Because MS Quixote has done such an excellent job covering the historic origins of the Euthyphro Dilemma and the traditional use of ED by atheists, I will not delve into those sections of his essay here. I hope that my readers of this entry will already have some knowledge of the dilemma, and if they don't, I recommend MS Quixote's summary of it, because he does a much better job of summarizing it then I could have done.

Let's cut right to the meat of this discussion: Quixote's critiques of the dilemma.

MS Quixote asserts that:

Another nemesis of the dilemma is the tertium quid, the third option. If a viable third option is presented, the dilemma is rightly deemed a false dilemma. The dilemmas above appear to be true dilemmas; there do not appear to be other alternatives to dead/alive and pregnant/not pregnant. However, if a dilemma states that children like either football or baseball, it is rather simple to provide other options, say, basketball. Thus, the dilemma is defeated. This is commonly referred to as “passing through the horns of the dilemma.”

Lastly, one may “grasp the horns of the dilemma.” If it may be shown that one or both of the premises of a dilemma is false, the dilemma is successfully defeated. With ED, the theist is able to both pass through the horns and grasp them.

So, is the theist really able to both pass through the horns of the Euthyphro Dilemma and grasp them? This is the bedrock of MS Quixote's argument: if I cannot demonstrate that his arguments (which purport to demonstrate that the theist can pass through and grasp the horns of the ED) are invalid, then I cannot state that MS Quixote is incorrect when he claims that the ED argues for theism rather than atheism.

MS Quixote's first step is to demonstrate that the Euthyphro Dilemma is, in fact, a false dilemma, by presenting a viable alternative, a third option, in addition to the two horns of the Dilemma as summarized:

The first horn of the dilemma—Is good willed by God because it is good—locates the good independently of God. The good is conceived of as some standard or other that God recognizes in determining what is good. If this state of affairs obtains, God is subservient to standard independent of his eternal being; there is at least one entity He is not sovereign over. Moreover, he becomes the mere messenger of goodness. Admittedly, this position is untenable for Christian theists.

The second horn of the dilemma—or is it good because it is willed by God—tends to render the commands of God arbitrary. The ED proponent argues with this horn that God could have just as well commanded rape and murder as goods, and that they are evils is only at the whim of God’s command. Furthermore, under the second horn, often referred to as Divine Command Ethics (DCT), it is difficult to make informative claims about Gods goodness, if goodness is solely based upon what God says it is. What does it then mean to say that God is good?

While acknowledging that both horns of the original dilemma are untenable for Christianity, MS Quixote presents his third option:

The first philosophic move of the theist is to pass through the horns of the ED by locating the Good as the nature of God. In effect, the theist answers the dilemma by saying “neither.” Hence, the theist claims that the good is not independent of God, as posited by horn one, nor is the good commanded by God, as claimed by horn two. In effect, a tertium quid is presented: God’s nature is the paradigm of goodness. God’s nature is the good.

Ah ha, the ED is clearly bunk, then! So we're finished, right?

Not necessarily.

As MS Quixote aptly recognizes, many proponents of the Euthyphro Dilemma are not prepared to accept this alternative as an answer to the dilemma. In fact, these critics argue that this framing only moves the dilemma one step farther back:

ED is re-erected around the theist’s contention that God’s nature is the good: Is God’s goodness good in relation to some independent standard, or it is good because God’s character is good? The former presents the same problem as the first horn of the original dilemma, the latter, the same problem as the second horn of the original dilemma which again seems arbitrary or whimsical. After all, God’s character could have been anything.

MS Quixote responds that those critics who reply to his offered alternative with this response fail to understand exactly what he really means with his third option:

Theists generally consider the reformulation of the dilemma a clear indicator that the ED supporter has misunderstood the theist contention that God’s nature is the good. Note, the theist objection does not say that God’s nature is good; it says that God’s nature is the good.

The ED supporter has attempted to establish an infinite regress with the reformulation of the dilemma; however, the theist response precludes this outcome by positing God’s nature as a metaphysical ultimate, a brute fact of existence. Brute facts are explanatory propositions that require or admit no explanation themselves.

So God's goodness is a brute fact of existence. But wait, God's nature isn't good; it is the good, according to MS Quixote.

So how we can call God "good" if we have no standard for what is "good"? If "the good" is defined as God's nature, then anything that is God's nature is "the good". But God could be entirely malevolent, and since it is his nature, then complete malevolence is "the good". For who are the pots to question the potter? God can smash all of them if he wants, err, if that's his nature.

And why not? What's preventing God from being completely malevolent? And how do we know that if there is a God, that he isn't entirely malevolent? If God's nature is "the good", and we cannot define "the good" apart from God's nature, then how can we ascribe any qualities at all to this nebulous concept known as "the good"?

If we agree with MS Quixote's definition of "the good", then we now have no coherent standard for whether something is good or evil. In fact, good and evil become meaningless and obsolete; things are either part of "the good" or they are not part of "the good". God's nature defines what is "the good". And those who speak in the name of God get to define what is God's nature!

"Those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities." - Voltaire

"Considering the Bible and Christianity Without A Prior God Belief Is Meaningless"

"And, I concur; considering the Bible and Christianity without a prior God belief is meaningless."

Commenter MS Quixote raised this point in the midst of a discussion on the blog Daylight Atheism.

I have seen this point raised so many times that I feel it is necessary for me to address this point directly, once and for all, on record.

First, what exactly does it mean to consider the Bible and Christianity?

I state here that I am assuming that what I mean by "considering the Bible and Christianity" is that I am considering whether I believe the spiritual claims are true. If this can be said more precisely, please let me know how I can summarize this in a more accurate way.

I assume that MS Quixote wants to know if the claims of the Bible and Christianity are true, and that he assumes that other people want to know if the claims of the Bible and Christianity are true, and that this is what he means when he says "considering the Bible and Christianity".

I hope I have made correct assumptions in determining what each of us is trying to accomplish when we consider the Bible and Christianity, because those assumptions are fundamental to this exercise.

In the comments section of the original entry by MS Quixote, I noted that Muslims do approach the Bible and Christianity with a prior god belief, but they still have different god beliefs than Christians.

MS Quixote was gracious enough to recognize this, and amended his statement to say that one needs a Christian god belief before considering Christianity and the Bible in a meaningful way. At least, I hope this is what he meant to say, and that I have correctly stated his position.

In suggesting an experiment with MS Quixote's line of reasoning, I am providing the following counter-examples for comparison:

"And, I concur; considering the Qu'ran and Islam without a prior belief in Allah is meaningless."

"And, I concur; considering the Book of Mormon without a prior belief in the revelations of Joseph Smith is meaningless."

"And, I concur; considering the Bhagavad-Gita without a prior belief in Krishna is meaningless."

I wonder if MS Quixote would have any objections to these lines of reasoning if he encountered them in a discussion from a fellow theist, albeit one of a different belief system than his own?

If Christianity can be a properly basic belief, then can Hinduism also be a properly basic belief? Can Islam be a properly basic belief? What about Mormonism?

According to the basic tenets of these religions, not all of them can be true. Therefore, if one can say that the followers of all of these religions have properly basic beliefs, one can say that out of a large number of the people who have properly basic beliefs, many of them have properly basic beliefs that are wrong.

I believe that this circumstance should give anyone who defends religious belief with the notion of "properly basic belief" a moment of pause.

If a large number of people who have properly basic beliefs about a subject are wrong, then one should acknowledge that having a properly basic belief alone is not good enough as a standard for one to be confident of one's conclusions about a subject.

The idea that only consideration of Christianity with a prior belief in the Christian god can be meaningful does not account for the way human beings actually believe in things and acquire beliefs about the subject of religion. I have given counter-examples of patterns of belief in other religious belief systems to demonstrate where I believe that this argument is deficient.

Lastly, there are probably many areas where I have said something that is not as precise as it could be, or I have said something which is a mischaracterization or a misinterpretation, or I have not been clear enough in articulating my ideas. I openly acknowledge the possibility of errors, and if someone can identify them, I will gladly revise my statements. I freely admit that I am a relative novice in discussions of religion and philosophy, but I hope to learn as much as possible as I increase in experience and practice, and to continue a civil and productive discussion of belief and knowledge and "life, the universe, and everything".